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Externalist representationalists claim that the phenomenal character of a visual perceptual 
experience is determined by the representational content of that experience. Their 
deployment of the idea that perceptual experience is transparent shows that they account 
for representational content with reference to the properties which are represented – the 
properties out there in the world. I explain why this commits the externalist 
representationalist to objectivism and realism about colour properties. Colour physicalism 
has proved to be the position of choice for externalist representationalists (who tend to be 
motivated by a commitment to physicalism). However, my aim in this paper is to 
demonstrate that the proponent of the view which combines externalist representationalism 
with colour physicalism is unable to account for the phenomenal character of colour 
hallucination.  
  
1. Colour Physicalism  
Colour physicalism is the view that colours can be identified with certain physical properties of 
objects, typically surface spectral reflectance profiles (the proportion of incident light the object 
reflects at each wavelength of the visible spectrum). (Armstrong 1969, 1987, Byrne and Hilbert 
2003, Dretske 1995, Hilbert 1987, Jackson 1996, 2007, Kripke 1980, Lewis 1997, Matthen 1988, 
Shoemaker 1986, Smart 1975, Tye 2000) Proponents of this view claim that their account has a 
number of advantages over rival accounts. One advertised benefit is that it preserves our 
commonsense belief that objects do indeed possess colour properties (in contrast with 
eliminativism and subjectivism which deny this). What is more, colour physicalists defend our 
everyday conception of colours as properties that objects have intrinsically and objectively (rather 
than in virtue of standing in a particular relation to a certain kind of observer). The view is 
metaphysically parsimonious since colours are physical properties of objects, and it is in-line with 
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our scientific account of the causal processes involved in colour perception. After all, the surface 
spectral reflectance profile of the object does indeed determine the proportion of incident light 
reflected at each wavelength of the visible spectrum, and this determines the activation levels in 
the retinal cone cells - the first stage in the causal process leading to our colour experience. Colour 
physicalism thus seems to accomplish the difficult task of satisfying both our common-sense view 
of colours and our scientific understanding of the processes involved in colour perception.   
If this was the end of the matter the physicalist account of colour would be rather appealing. 
Unfortunately, our scientific investigations have revealed a surprising fact about the involvement 
of particular surface reflectance profiles in our colour experiences. Metamers are two (or more) 
different surface reflectance profiles which we experience as being exactly the same colour under 
some (it need not be all) illumination conditions. In other words, the colours we experience do not 
map one-to-one onto particular surface reflectance profiles. Consequently, physicalists have 
modified their account - colours become disjunctive properties [Smart 1975, Armstrong 1987, 
Lycan 2001, Shoemaker 1986], or types of surface reflectance [Byrne & Hilbert 2003], or the 
higher-order property of having one or another surface reflectance. [Tye personal communication] 
Of course, identifying colour properties with disjunctive properties, types, or higher-order 
properties makes the physicalist’s account rather less attractive. These properties meet the 
standards imposed by realism and objectivism, but they are rather gerrymandered for all that. (See, 
for example, Audi 2013 for an argument against the very existence of disjunctive properties.) 
However, my concern is not with colour physicalism per se, but rather with the position which 
results from conjoining colour physicalism with externalist representationalism. So now let me 
explain why the externalist representationalist is committed to colour physicalism.1  
2. Externalist Representationalism  
Representationalists claim that the phenomenal character of our perceptual experiences is 
determined by (or grounded in, or constituted by, or identical to) their representational content.2  
                                                 
1 For a discussion of the main philosophical accounts of colour properties see Gow 2014.  
2 The details regarding the precise nature of the relation between representational content and phenomenal character 
need not concern us here.  
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For externalist representationalists, representational content ultimately depends on the externally 
located properties our experiences represent. (Dretske 1995, 2000, Lycan 1996, Tye 1995, 2000)3 
This is evident from the way the externalist representationalist deploys the idea that perceptual 
experience is ‘transparent’ in their dispute with the qualia theorist, who claims that phenomenal 
character depends (at least in part) on internally realized qualia.4 Consider the following:  
[The transparency claim] tells us that in the case of perceptual experiences, the only 
qualities of which we are introspectively aware are qualities of external things if they are 
qualities of anything at all. (Tye 2009: 119)  
[T]he key transparency claims are as follows: in a case of normal perception, if we 
introspect:  
(1) We are not aware of features of our visual experience.   
(2) We are not aware of the visual experience itself.     
(3) We cannot attend to features of the visual experience.     
(4) The only features of which we are aware and to which we can attend are external  
  features (colors and shapes of surfaces, for example) (Tye 2014a: 40)    
I experienced blue as a property of the ocean not as a property of my experience. My 
experience itself certainly wasn't blue. Rather it was an experience that represented the 
ocean as blue. What I was really delighting in, then, was a quality represented by the 
experience, not a quality of the experience. It was the color, blue, not anything else that 
was immediately accessible to my consciousness and that I found so pleasing. (Tye 2002: 
448)  
                                                 
3 Some representationalists hold that mode or aspect also makes a difference to the phenomenal character. (Crane 
2013)  
4 In previous work (Gow 2016) I have argued that we should distinguish between phenomenological transparency 
(the idea that perceptual experiences seem only to involve externally located objects and properties) and metaphysical 
transparency (the idea that perceptual experiences in fact only involve externally located objects and properties). 
Externalist representationalists require metaphysical transparency, yet introspection can only give us (at best) 
phenomenological transparency. Since we have yet to be presented with a successful argument for deriving 
metaphysical transparency from phenomenological transparency, transparency claims cannot tell us anything about 
the metaphysics of perceptual experience.   
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[W]e normally “see right through” perceptual states to external objects… (Lycan 1996: 
117)  
  
It is clear from these quotations why externalists must be objectivists and realists about colour: 
ultimately, the phenomenal character of our perceptual experiences depends essentially upon the 
externally located properties to which we are related. As William Lycan points out:  
[T]he Representational theory requires color realism, for it explicates color qualia in terms 
of the real- (and unreal-) world colors of physical objects; “yellow” means the objective, 
public property inhering in physical objects. One could not then turn around and explicate 
the ostensible colors of physical objects in terms of color qualia (e.g., as the disposition to 
produce yellow qualia in normal human percipients). (Lycan 2001: 20)  
The only other objectivist and realist theory of colour which is compatible with the externalist’s 
understanding of transparency is primitivism, which is the view that colour properties are simple, 
objective, intrinsic, qualitative properties which are not reducible to physical properties. (See 
Campbell 1994.) However, since externalist representationalists tend to be committed to a 
physicalist metaphysics, primitivism is not an option they are keen to take up.   
Externalist representationalism seems to be in-line with our common-sense understanding 
of perception as essentially directed on the objective, mind-independent world. However, just as 
the colour physicalist’s otherwise appealing account was challenged by the phenomenon of 
metamers, the externalist representationalist’s promising explanatory system is challenged by the 
phenomenon of hallucination. As we have seen from the previous quotations, externalist 
representationalists explain the phenomenal character of ordinary perceptual experience in terms 
of the properties in the world of which the perceiver is aware. It is obvious why hallucinations are 
a challenge for the externalist representationalist’s framework - if Tye’s experience of the blue 
ocean (say) happened to be a hallucination, then the phenomenal character of his experience cannot 
be explained with reference to the actual blueness instantiated by the ocean. In hallucinatory cases 
there are no (relevant) externally located objects and properties, so how do hallucinations get their 
phenomenal character according to externalist representationalism? The most popular answer is 
that hallucinations involve the awareness of uninstantiated properties. (This position is widely 
endorsed, see Bealer 1982, Bengson et al. 2011, Dretske 2000, Forrest 2005, Horgan, Graham & 
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Tienson 2004, Johnston 2004, Lycan 2001, McGinn 1999, Pautz 2007, Sosa 2007 and Tye 2002, 
2014a, 2014b.) Tye says, following on from the quotation above:  
In the case of hallucinations, (4), in my view, should be replaced by:  
(4’’) The only features of which we are aware and to which we can attend are locally 
uninstantiated features of a sort that, if they belong to anything, belong to external 
particulars. (Tye 2014a: 41)  
He also says:  
Along with (most) other representationalists, I am happy to say that, in the hallucinatory 
case, the perceiver is conscious of an un-instantiated property. (Tye 2014b)  
Agreed: you cannot attend to what is not there. But on my view there is an un-instantiated 
quality there in the bad cases… an un-instantiated quality is present in hallucination. (Tye 
2014a: 51)  
Here is Dretske’s analysis:   
Hallucinations are experiences in which one is aware of properties (shapes, colors, 
movements, etc.) without being o-conscious [object-conscious] of objects having these 
properties.... Hallucinating about pumpkins is not to be understood as an awareness of 
orange pumpkin-shaped objects. It is rather to be understood as p-awareness 
[propertyawareness] of the kind of properties that o-awareness of pumpkins is usually 
accompanied by.... Awareness (ie. p-awareness) of properties without awareness (o-
awareness) of objects having these properties may still strike some readers as bizarre. Can 
we really be aware of (uninstantiated) universals? Yes, we can, and, yes, we sometimes 
are. (Dretske 2000: 163)  
Of course, there are a number of general worries which arise from positing relations to 
uninstantiated properties, indeed, we may find the uninstantiated properties themselves 
ontologically problematic (Kriegel 2011, Papineau 2014, Schellenberg 2011). However, I will put 
these issues aside to focus on a specific objection to externalist representationalism which arises 
as a result of their commitment to colour physicalism.  
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3. The Problem 
  
Imagine that Belinda is having an ordinary perceptual experience of a yellow plastic duck. 
According to the externalist representationalist, Belinda’s experience is transparent, and so the 
particular shade of yellow involved in her experience is a property of the duck (not a property of 
her experience). To say that the duck is yellow is to say that the duck possesses the higher-order 
or disjunctive property of having one or another surface spectral reflectance profiles, or that it has 
a particular type of surface spectral reflectance profile. (It will be dialectically simpler if I direct 
my objection to the disjunctive property version of colour physicalism, although it applies equally 
to the ‘higher-order’ and the ‘type’ versions.) Of course, the duck possesses the disjunctive 
property of having one or another surface spectral reflectance property in virtue of having a 
particular surface spectral reflectance profile. It is because and only because, the object has one or 
another of these surface spectral reflectance profiles that it qualifies as instantiating the disjunctive 
property ‘yellow’ – so ultimately, the ‘yellow’ phenomenal character of Belinda’s experience 
depends on a particular surface spectral reflectance property. In other words, Belinda is aware of 
the disjunctive property ‘yellow’ in virtue of being aware of the particular surface spectral 
reflectance property instantiated by the plastic duck.  
I must emphasize that it is not part of my claim that Belinda must be aware of one of the 
disjuncts as being the disjunct it is. Nor is she required to know that yellow is a disjunctive property 
and that her awareness of this colour depends on her being aware of a particular disjunct -  a 
particular surface spectral reflectance profile. My claim is just that Belinda must, as a matter of 
fact, be aware of (in the minimal sense of being relevantly related to) one of the disjuncts.5 It is 
important to note, in addition, that Belinda could not be aware of (in the sense of being relevantly 
related to) the disjunctive property without being aware of one of the disjuncts. In the same way 
that the plastic duck can only instantiate the disjunctive property yellow by possessing one of the 
disjuncts (a particular surface spectral reflectance profile), Belinda can only be aware of the 
disjunctive property by being aware of one of the disjuncts.  
Now suppose that Belinda’s experience has not been caused in the ordinary way at all; in 
fact, Belinda is hallucinating a yellow plastic duck. Since there is no actual plastic duck in front 
                                                 
5 I would like to thank an anonymous referee for pointing out the need for clarification here.   
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of Belinda, the yellow she experiences which is represented as being a property of a plastic duck 
is uninstantiated (recall the quotations above). However, we need an explanation of how it is that 
this particular uninstantiated property makes it into the content of her experience: in other words, 
what makes Belinda’s hallucination a yellow plastic duck experience rather than a red plastic duck 
experience, or a blue plastic duck experience? For perceptual experiences that are caused in the 
ordinary way, it is easy for the externalist to explain how the disjunctive property gets into the 
content of the experience: it piggy-backs on one of the disjuncts. Belinda is aware of the disjunctive 
property ‘yellow’ by being aware of the particular surface spectral reflectance property which is 
instantiated in her environment. This explanation is not available in the hallucinatory case, because 
there is no (relevant) particular surface spectral reflectance property instantiated in Belinda’s 
environment.6  
The externalist representationalist would seem to have two options when it comes to 
responding to this challenge. First, they could claim that the hallucinatory case mirrors the ordinary 
case: Belinda is aware of the uninstantiated disjunctive property ‘yellow’ by being aware of an 
uninstantiated particular surface spectral reflectance property. Unfortunately, this is a short-lived 
solution. The problem of metamers reappears; for now we are owed an explanation of which of the 
metameric particular surface spectral reflectance profiles Belinda’s hallucinatory experience 
involves. Imagine that Belinda owns a collection of yellow plastic ducks, but they all have different 
surface spectral reflectance profiles (they are metamers). When Belinda has an ordinary perceptual 
experience of yellow (when looking at one of the ducks) it is easy to specify which disjunct is 
involved in her experience. She experiences yellow because she is related to a particular surface 
reflectance property – a property of a particular plastic duck. If the hallucinatory case is going to 
mirror the ordinary case, then Belinda must be aware of an uninstantiated particular surface 
spectral reflectance property in order for her to be aware of the uninstantiated disjunctive property 
yellow. But which one? Since all of the disjuncts of the disjunctive property yellow are equally 
uninstantiated, there seems to be no basis whatsoever for holding that she is aware of one of them 
rather than another. This is not a mere epistemic worry; my objection is not just that the externalist 
                                                 
6  Colour illusions will also pose a problem for the externalist representationalist. However, the case of seeing 
something blue as yellow is more complicated than the case of simply hallucinating yellow. The former will, after all, 
involve a particular surface reflectance property, it just won’t be a disjunct of yellow (it will be a disjunct of blue). 
For simplicity I have restricted my focus to hallucinatory situations. I would like to thank an anonymous referee for 
asking for clarification on this.  
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representationalist cannot tell us which uninstantiated particular surface spectral reflectance 
property Belinda is aware of. My objection is that no sense can be made of there being a fact of 
the matter at all on the externalist representationalist’s view.   
Perhaps there is one way that there could be a fact of the matter for the externalist 
representationalist; they could argue that it is simply a fact about the perceptual psychologies of 
human beings that we come with defaults. When we are aware of the disjunctive property yellow 
we default to being aware of a particular disjunct – a particular surface spectral reflectance 
property. In the ordinary case, our perceptual system overrides this default when there is an 
instantiated alternative disjunct present, but in hallucinations we revert to the default.7   
I think that a response along these lines will prove ultimately to be unsatisfactory. Let me 
explain why. First, we tend to think that what we can hallucinate mirrors what we can perceive in 
the ordinary way. However, it is a consequence of the view suggested above, that although we can 
be veridically aware of all of the disjuncts (all the particular surface spectral reflectance properties) 
we will typically only hallucinate one disjunct. While this may be an unwelcome consequence of 
the externalist representationalist’s view, it hardly constitutes a knock-down objection. A more 
serious worry with the proposal under discussion is simply that it seems ad hoc. Since there are no 
independent reasons for postulating the existence of an in-built default mechanism, we are owed 
an explanation for its origin that isn’t merely a stipulation designed to save a threatened theory. I 
think that a satisfactory explanation will be difficult to find. Externalist representationalist may try 
to justify a commitment to a default mechanism by appealing to the environment of our 
evolutionary ancestors. Perhaps our ancestors evolved in an environment where one of the 
particular surface spectral reflectances dominated (for example). If this was the case, then having 
a built-in default might confer a selective advantage and its existence could be explained as an 
adaptation. Unfortunately, metamers are quite common, particularly in the range of dark colours, 
which suggests that this response will lead to a dead-end.   
Of course, the fact that having a default is unlikely to have an adaptive advantage does not 
prove that we don’t have this kind of built-in bias. Perhaps it is an evolutionary spandrel which 
freerides on an adaptive advantage elsewhere. Now, it is one thing to identify a particular feature 
in an organism and argue that it is a spandrel, but it is quite another to claim this status for a feature 
                                                 
7 I would like to thank an anonymous referee for this interesting response on behalf of the externalist representationalist 
and their input in the following discussion.  
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one has no independent evidence for, but has merely postulated to defend one’s theory. More 
importantly, even if having a built-in bias is a spandrel, we are still owed an explanation for its 
existence. Although the explanation for the existence of particular spandrels does not appeal to 
their having an original selective advantage, we still have (or at least, rightfully expect) an 
explanation of their origin.8 Until we are told some plausible story about how we have come to 
have a built-in default, the idea remains an unmotivated ad hoc claim.   
If the externalist representationalist simply denies that they need to explain the origin of 
the postulated default mechanism, then they are really just conceding the point of my argument. 
After all, my objection is that they cannot provide an adequate explanation of how there can be a 
fact of the matter regarding which disjunct we are related to in a hallucination. Stipulating that we 
come with a default, while denying the need to justify its existence by providing an explanation 
for its origin, seems no different from granting my conclusion.   
So much for the first option for responding to my challenge. The second option the 
externalist representationalist could take is to argue that one can be aware of a disjunctive property 
without being aware of one of the disjuncts.9 However, this would be pretty controversial; an object 
cannot possess a disjunctive property without possessing one of the disjuncts (something cannot 
be ‘red-or-round’ unless it is red or round), and this kind of requirement would seem to apply 
equally to the awareness of disjunctive properties. Let us suppose that ‘jade’ is a disjunctive 
property, with the disjuncts being jadeite and nephrite.  It just seems obvious that one cannot be 
aware of jade without being aware of jadeite or nephrite.10 Being aware of either jadeite or nephrite 
just is what it is to be aware of jade.   
Perhaps the externalist representationalist will say that the hallucinatory case is special; 
somehow, during hallucinations we can be aware of disjunctive properties without being aware of 
any of the disjuncts, even though in the ordinary case this would be impossible. There are two 
                                                 
8 Consider an example: some species of snail have an open umbilicus which they use as a chamber to protect their 
eggs. Although this feature wasn’t selected specifically for this purpose (it’s a spandrel), we do have an explanation 
for its origin: the snail grows by coiling a tube around an axis and this generates a cylindrical space along the axis.  
(Gould 1997: 10753))  
9 I would like to thank an anonymous referee for pushing me to develop this idea.  
10 To reiterate a point I made earlier: one need not be aware of the disjunct as being (eg.) jadeite or nephrite. Nor need 
one know that jade is a disjunctive property. My claim is only that to be aware of jade at all, one must, as a matter 
of fact, be aware of either jadeite or nephrite.   
11 I owe this point to Mark Cremer.  
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problems with this response. First, it seems to have the flavour of an ad hoc stipulation which has 
no independent motivation and just functions to bolster a threatened theory. Second, ordinary 
perceptual experiences and hallucinations would turn out to be very different kinds of perceptual 
experience – the first would involve the awareness of a particular surface reflectance property 
(which enables the awareness of the disjunctive colour property), and the second would just 
involve an awareness of the disjunctive colour property.11 This would be an unlikely move for a 
view which is keen to defend the idea that ordinary perceptual experiences and hallucinations are 
the same kind of state.9  
 
4. Conclusion 
I have argued that externalist representationalists must be objectivists and realists about colour 
properties. If they are committed to upholding physicalism, they must be colour physicalists. 
However, their commitment to colour physicalism leaves the externalist representationalist unable 
to provide an account of the phenomenal character of colour hallucination.10    
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